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Introduction: Problems of Causation in World Politicsi 
 
What do the following questions have in common? 
 Why do democracies not go to war with one another? 
 What made the 19th-century Concert system more peaceful than its predecessor? 
 How is democracy most effectively promoted? 
 What impact does climate change have on migration? 
One important feature they share is that in order to answer them we will need to advance causal 
claims about world politics.ii  This indicates how tightly questions about causation are bound into the 
fabric of International Relations [IR].  Yet the point is not merely that these are causal questions, but 
also that how we think about causation and causal explanation will shape the kinds of answers we 
give and that those answers will, in turn, shape our understanding of the options open to 
policymakers and hence our judgements of their decisions.  In other words, our stances on matters 
such as conflict prevention, democracy promotion and migration management are likely to be 
shaped by often tacit beliefs about the nature of causal processes and the extent to which they are 
amenable to human influence. 
 
Recognizing this, we might turn to philosophy for guidance as to how to think about causation.  If we 
do, we are liable to encounter a baffling range of positions (see Lebow 2014: 23-38).  One that has 
proved highly influential within IR is Martin Hollis and Steve Smith’s (1991: 1-7) distinction between 
two traditions of inquiry:  a scientific, causal tradition which generates ‘explanations’ from the 
‘outside’ and a hermeneutic or interpretive tradition which generates ‘understanding’ from the 
‘inside’.  There are, however, several problems with this way of thinking about causal inquiry in IR.  
First, although they acknowledge the philosophical difficulties associated with it, Hollis and Smith’s 
rendering of the causal tradition is strongly rooted in mid-twentieth-century positivism.  Whereas 
they ask how applicable positivism is to the social sciences, it may be more pertinent to ask how 
adequate it is as an account of natural science (see Bhaskar 2008).iii  Second, Hollis and Smith’s 
(1991: 7) insistence that there are ‘always two stories to tell’, causal and non-causal, and that these 
cannot easily be combined reflects this highly restrictive understanding of the nature of causal 
explanation.  Third, as Milja Kurki (2008: 5-6) notes, this taken-for-granted division between causal 
and non-causal approaches has worked to suppress debate about causation.  Philosophers do not 
tend to dispute the meaning of the concept of causation, which denotes a form of natural 
necessitation or, in ordinary language, bringing about.  They do, however, dispute (i) whether this 
concept of causation is merely an idea or rather corresponds to something real, (ii) the meaning of 
causal claims (for example, whether causal claims can and should be understood in counterfactual 
terms); (iii) how and to what extent we can generate knowledge of causal processes; and (iv) which 
methods, if any, are peculiarly appropriate for causal analysis. 
 
Elements of these deeper philosophical disputes have, in recent years, made their way into IR, 
largely driven by the emergence of Critical Realism as a distinctive philosophical position within the 
discipline (see Wendt 1999; Patomäki and Wight 2000; Patomäki 2002; Wight 2006; Kurki 2008; 
Wight & Joseph 2010).  At the heart of the Critical Realist position is a critique of what Kurki (2008: 
6) terms the ‘Humean conception of causation’, that is, the attempt to ground causal analysis in the 
identification of empirical regularities.  This approach, Critical Realists argue, fails to take seriously 
the idea that the social world is predominantly an open system in which we cannot expect to find 
the kinds of regularities which scientists seek to isolate through experiment.  Critical Realism 
provides a powerful alternative vision of a social world that is differentiated, layered and structured 
and in which underlying and unobservable causal powers and dispositions produce complex effects.  
Yet important questions remain about the extent to which philosophy can help us resolve problems 
of causation in world politics.  Even if Critical Realists successfully expose the limitations of 
Humeanism, are their arguments equally successful against other forms of anti-realism (see Chernoff 
2002; Lebow 2014)?  If Patrick Jackson (2011) is right that a Critical Realist philosophical ontology 
should be understood as a wager on a par with that taken by neopositivists and others, then 
philosophy appears to open up multiple conflicting routes to answering the questions listed above. 
 
One way in which recent philosophically-inspired discussion has, nonetheless, made a significant 
contribution is in questioning the widespread supposition that causal analysis is inimical to critical 
inquiry.  As Kurki (2008: 124-44) shows, those critical IR theorists who have sought to distance their 
approaches from discussion of causality have really been rejecting a particular, Humean, form of 
causal analysis (see also Kurki and Suganami 2012).  Yet it is crucial to recognize that this approach, 
and the methodological principles which accompany it (see, for example, King, Keohane and Verba 
1994), does not exhaust all that can be said about causation in IR.  It is perfectly possible to conduct 
causal analysis in a fashion which: is attentive to complexity and history; explains how and why 
patterns of behaviour and outcomes arise, rather than treating them as given; exposes the political 
effects of various forms of representation, including causal claims themselves; recognizes that 
reasons can be causes; and explores the conditions of possibility for particular outcomes as well as 
their efficient causes.  In other words, if the language of causation, broadly understood, is hard to 
escape (see Kurki 2008: 16), then we should expect this to be reflected in the breadth of the causal 
questions we ask and the methods we use to answer them.  Contrary to what is suggested by Hollis 
and Smith (1991), critical and interpretive questions and methods have an important place within 
causal inquiry. 
 
This special issue therefore takes seriously much of the Critical Realist critique of the quasi-Humean 
approaches which dominate much of mainstream IR.  The authors all broadly accept that the social 
world is an open system characterized by various forms of causal complexity and reject the overly-
demanding expectations of causal analysis associated with the idea that we can discover causal laws 
and use them to make watertight predictions.  We also take seriously the demand by critical scholars 
that insofar as we engage with problems of causation in world politics it is necessary to think not 
only in terms of efficient causes but also in terms of constraining and enabling conditions, including 
actors’ reasons and the social structures which shape their understanding of the conditions of 
possibility they confront.  We are also keenly aware that just as the ways in which we think about 
causation constrain and enable particular causal narratives, so causal claims themselves can have 
causal consequences insofar as they are internalized or acted on by policymakers (see, for example, 
Ish-Shalom 2013). 
 
However, this special issue seeks to move beyond an increasingly entrenched debate between 
Critical Realists and their critics (see, for example, Wight 2007; Chernoff 2007) by exploring how the 
issues identified in those debates make their way into the broader discipline of IR and, beyond that, 
into world politics itself.  Indeed, the contributors collectively identify at least five layers of analysis 
in how we think about causation in world politics: 
1. Philosophical questions about what causation is, what we can know about it, and how, 
including the extent to which philosophy can answer such questions (see Suganami, this 
volume) 
2. How causal claims are operationalized in causal explanations and what kinds of distinctive 
considerations emerge when we ask about the qualities of good causal explanations (see 
Jackson, Humphreys, this volume) 
3. The extent to which causal thinking can be put to work to illuminate important dimensions 
of world politics (see Humphreys, Guzzini, Betts & Pilath, this volume) 
4. The impact of causal thinking in and on world politics (see Kurki, Betts & Pilath, this volume) 
5. Our capacity, through causal analysis, to think the future of world politics (see Patomäki, this 
volume) 
 
Explicitly identifying these five dimensions of how we think about causation in world politics 
highlights the fact that causal claims are not simply (according to our preferred criteria) right or 
wrong, better or worse evidenced, or more or less methodologically sound.  Causal claims operate as 
interventions in the discipline of IR and, more broadly, in world politics.  They are used by politicians, 
policymakers, academics, and ordinary citizens to satisfy curiosity, to resolve disputes, to justify 
actions (including, for example, the use of force), to counter criticism, to articulate and defend 
viewpoints, to allocate resources, and more.  Confronting problems of causation in world politics 
therefore requires us to take seriously not only philosophical and methodological arguments about 
the proper nature of causal analysis, but also the many ways in which causal thinking shapes and is 
used to shape our world. 
 
The special issue begins with a discussion by Hidemi Suganami of the common framing of debates 
about the nature of causation in the social world in terms of a dispute between Hume and Bhaskar.  
Noting various points at which the standard treatments of these authors can be misleading, 
Suganami sets the scene for the subsequent papers by identifying a little noticed agreement 
between Hume and Bhaskar over the idea that the empirical world is largely an open system, though 
one which may be characterized by local, partial closures in which causally-generated regularities are 
observable.  This has important implications for our study of causal processes in IR.  It means that 
the search for regularities is defensible but cannot be all that causal analysis involves: we also need 
to engage in more historically-oriented efforts to explain outcomes that cannot be subsumed under 
observable regularities.  But Suganami also notes that at this point we reach the limits of what 
philosophy can offer to inquiries into problems of causation in world politics. 
 
The next two contributions, by Patrick Jackson and Adam Humphreys, continue to engage with 
philosophy, but shift the focus away from the nature of causation to the nature of causal 
explanation.  This is an oddly neglected topic in IR for, as both authors identify, explanations are 
partly pragmatic: they are human responses to particular problem situations.  If we are interested in 
explaining particular aspects of world politics, as so many of us are, we need to think not only about 
how to identify causes, but also about how causal claims are operationalized in causal explanations. 
 
Jackson argues that causal explanation should be understood not as involving the subsumption of 
particular instances under a general law, but as a practical-intentional activity which aims to give the 
recipient of the explanation a practical competence and understanding that they were previously 
lacking.  Thus causal explanation is a different kind of activity from the formulation of mere causal 
claims.  Because neopositivists mistakenly conflate the two, they also neglect to consider how their 
causal claims might be put to work in explanations which build practical competencies grounded in 
causal understandings.  As with Suganami’s contribution, Jackson’s argument points towards the 
need to think of causal explanation in more historical terms, recognizing that the case-specific 
nature of causal explanation requires engagement not merely with regularities, but also with how 
multiple causal factors come together in case-specific configurations. 
 
Humphreys highlights the implications of complexity for causal explanation.  In world politics, most 
events we seek to explain have causal histories which are, to all intents and purposes, infinitely long 
and susceptible to infinitely detailed description.  We therefore need to take seriously the often-
neglected question of what to focus on, for our choices will significantly shape the kinds of causal 
explanations we develop.  Humphreys illustrates the significance of such choices in relation to 
debates between rationalist theorists and historians about what caused the relative peacefulness of 
the 19th-century Concert system.  What emerges is that the rationalist approach is pragmatically 
adequate only on a very restrictive understanding of what it is that we are trying to explain.  This, in 
turn, carries significant implications for the plausibility with which rationalists can trade on their 
ability to explain the peacefulness of the Concert system in offering policy prescriptions for the 
present. 
 
Stefano Guzzini’s contribution shows how important ideas about causation are for the study of 
world politics by exploring the difficulties that arise when power, one of IR’s central concepts, is 
conceptualized as an efficient cause.  He argues that power must be understood as relational, but 
that ultimately this requires us to embrace equifinality and non-linearity, which are incompatible 
with an understanding of power as an efficient cause.  Pointing out the significant role that power 
plays in many approaches to world politics, Guzzini argues that it is the commonplace 
conceptualization of power as an efficient cause that must give way.  He advocates conceiving of 
power in dispositional terms and argues that this exemplifies the broader case for conceiving of 
causation itself in dispositional terms.  He illustrates what such a dispositional approach to causal 
analysis might look like by showing how causal mechanisms may be construed in dispositional terms, 
thereby allowing them to be put to use in interpretive analysis. 
 
Moving beyond Guzzini’s focus on the impact of causal thinking in the discipline of International 
Relations, Milja Kurki examines the impact of causal thinking in world politics.  She does this by 
asking how Latour’s concept of ‘factish’ can illuminate the role of causal thinking in democracy 
support.  From a Latourian perspective, all causal thinking is an attempt to escape the realm of 
fetish, or belief, into a realm of fact, but this attempt can never be wholly successful.  The value of 
this perspective, Kurki argues, is that it focuses our attention on what causal analysis does in the 
world.  Whatever philosophical stance we might favour, the application of that stance produces a 
particular kind of lived reality.  This is what Kurki explores in relation to democracy support.  She 
argues that a full understanding of the role of causal thinking in democracy support activities must 
comprehend not only the presumptions about causal efficacy it embodies, but also the extent to 
which it contributes to the production of particular practices and understandings of democracy 
itself. Kurki thereby not only illustrates the substantive impact of causal thinking on international 
practices but also raises deep questions about what we can expect causal thinking to contribute to 
our attempts to shape world politics. 
 
Alex Betts and Angela Pilath build on Kurki’s interest in the impact of causal thinking on world 
politics by examining the political effects of causal claims linking environmental change to 
international migration.  They note that although this is a highly complex area in which causal claims 
are at best contestable, some simplistic and even dubious causal claims have nonetheless made 
their way into key international agreements.  To illustrate this, they explore the way in which causal 
claims around environmental migration were drawn upon in negotiations over the 2010 Cancún 
Adaptation Framework.  They show that even poorly supported causal claims could be used by 
participants to confer legitimacy on their negotiating positions and that these political dynamics 
resulted in relatively unsupported causal claims being incorporated into the text of the agreement.  
They thereby demonstrate the need to think carefully about the political impact of causal reasoning 
and the conditions under which such reasoning should be granted a privileged status in political 
negotiations. 
 
Patomäki concludes the special issue by asking to what extent it is possible for social scientists to 
predict or conceptualize the future of world politics.  Neopositivist approaches to causal analysis 
treat explanation and prediction as symmetrical and hence countenance at least the possibility of 
accurate prediction.  However, the key Critical Realist insight about the open systemic nature not 
only of the natural world but also, a fortiori, of the social world provides a strong reason to doubt 
that this is possible: even if local regularities are identified, they are liable to change as actors 
become aware of them and respond accordingly.  However, Patomäki argues that our ability to 
operate in the world with some success shows that it is not radically contingent: even if prediction 
based on regularities is a fruitless endeavour, social scientific inquiry can help us to understand the 
causal structures which shape the possibilities open to us.  This suggests the possibility, drawing on 
the Critical Realist vision of the world as a complex but structured reality, of engaging in a scenario-
building exercise in which a certain, if limited, kind of futurology is possible. 
 
Like Suganami, Jackson, Humphreys, and Guzzini, therefore, Patomäki is positive about our potential 
ability to grapple with problems of causation in world politics, even as he is sceptical of the utility of 
ingrained, neopositivist ways of thinking about causation.  The appropriate response to the 
limitations of these standard ways of thinking is not to give up on causal analysis, but to embrace 
complexity.  But like Kurki and Betts and Pilath, Patomäki is also aware of the need to explore the 
impact of causal thinking on the world.  Just as we cannot escape problems of causation in world 
politics, so we cannot escape the fact that our collective responses to them will partly shape our 
futures. 
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i I am grateful to Hidemi Suganami for comments on a previous draft of this introduction.  The 
papers that constitute this special issue originated in a workshop held at the University of Reading in 
June 2014.  The editors (Adam Humphreys and Hidemi Suganami) thank the Department of Politics 
and International Relations, the School of Politics, Economics and International Relations and the 
Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of Reading for making that 
workshop possible.  Several of the papers were also presented at the British International Studies 
Association’s annual conference in Dublin, also in June 2014.  We are  grateful to participants at the 
workshop and conference for stimulating questions and comments, to the many anonymous 
reviewers for their careful reading of the papers, and especially to Annette Freyberg-Inan at the 
Journal of International Relations and Development for her encouragement and support and for 
shepherding the process patiently and effectively. 
ii This is not to rule out the possibility that we will regard the questions as misleading in their current 
form and hence refuse the invitation to answer them. 
iii The kinds of positivist arguments on which they draw have long-since been abandoned even by 
empiricist philosophers of science (see van Fraassen 1980). 
